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[Courting Economic and Social Rights in Palestine]
Courting Economic and Social Rights in
Palestine: Justiciability, Enforceability and
the Role of the Supreme Constitutional
Court
Dr. Asem Khalil 
Abstract:
In this paper, I will discuss whether Economic and Social Rights (ESRs)
constitute fundamental rights in Palestine, as a result of their entrenchment in
the constitutional text, the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority; and if yes,
which ones. In fact, while in International Human Rights Law (IHRL), ESRs are
presented as a monolithic category of rights, they are not treated as such in
national constitutions. Some rights are simply missing from the text; others are
present but enjoy different status within the constitution – often depending on
the way they are written in the constitutional text, and on the way they are
applied by state institutions, in particular the courts. I will also discuss whether
those fundamental ESRs, in particular those that appear to be legally binding as
a result of their entrenchment in the constitutional text, are – and ought to be
– justiciable. I will finally discuss the theoretical and practical objections to the
role of a specialized Court in enforcing entrenched ESRs, through constitutional
adjudication.
1.

Introduction

On February 23, 2016, tens of thousands of Palestinian teachers took to the
streets to protest their poor pay and working conditions. The Palestinian
Authority regarded this development with suspicion, fearing that the protests,
in the context of the Fatah/Hamas split, could easily become ‘politicized’. The
Palestinian security forces established checkpoints in major West Bank cities,
with a view to preventing public school teachers from traveling to Ramallah to
participate in the main protests.(1) Debates among the general public in the
 Associate Professor of Law Constitutional and International, Vice President for Community
Affairs, Birzeit University.
 Accepted publication on 20/8/2017.
(1) ‘Palestinian security set up checkpoints to stop teachers protest,’ Ma’an Agency News (23
February 2016) http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=770405. All websites are
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aftermath of the teachers’ strike generally focused upon whether those
teachers have rights that the government are not fulfilling, and whether public
expenditure upon education is fair in comparison to other sectors (such as
security, for example). Additional questions arose in relation to the status of
human rights and levels of freedom within Palestinian society, in no small part
due to the government’s crack-down, (2) its refusal to recognize
representatives, and the restrictions that it imposed upon freedom of
movement.(3)
This example serves to reiterate that Economic and Social Rights (ESRs) –
such as the right to work, education, adequate standard of living – are
inseparable from civil and political rights (CPRs), such as the prohibition on
arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of movement, and freedom of
thought, belief and expression. This conclusion, which is frequently advanced
within studies of human rights, informs us that, in a just society, (4) we should
not have to choose between not being killed arbitrarily and subsistence; or
between privacy and the protection of our own family.
In opposing itself to the conventional wisdom that distinguishes between
different generations of rights upon the basis some are ‘negative’ while others
are ‘positive’, this paper attempts to expand the argument that ESRs are also
human rights.(5) This line of argument has strong roots within key legal
developments that have taken place over the twentieth century, including
both International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and modern waves of
constitutionalism.(6)
accessed on March 07, 2017, unless otherwise indicated.
(2) ‘West Bank teachers' strike goes on despite PA crackdown,’ Al Jazeera (9 March 2016).
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/west-bank-teachers-strike-pa-crackdown160309061718386.html
(3) It should be noted that Palestinian political representatives have recently ratified most
International Human Rights treaties. For a detailed presentation of the treaties that President
Abbas ratified in 2014, see: Dalia Hatuqa, ‘'Paradigm shift': Palestinians join treaties’, Aljazeera
(22 April 2014). Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/shift-palestiniansjoin-treaties-2014418111950813313.html.

(4) Jeff King, ‘Introduction,’ in Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 1.
(5) Ibid., 1-2.
(6) Ibid., 1; Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 221; David Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement,’ Harvard
International Law Journal 53 (2012): 406-7.
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While in international law ESRs are often presented as a monolithic
category of rights, this is not the form in which they are rendered within
national constitutions.(7) In this paper, I will seek to address the question of
whether ESRs, as a result of their entrenchment within the key Palestinian
constitutional text (the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority), can be said to
constitute fundamental rights in Palestine; in the event of accepting this
premise, it will seek to establish which ones. The situation is further
complicated by the fact that some rights are simply missing from the text;
others are present but enjoy different status within the constitution – their
precise meaning often being contingent upon their written form within
constitutional texts or upon their precise application by state institutions
(particularly the courts). In the course of my discussion I will also engage the
question of whether these fundamental ESRs, in particular those that appear
to be legally binding as a result of their entrenchment in the constitutional
text, are – and ought to be – justiciable.(8) In concluding, I will discuss the
theoretical and practical objections to the proposition that a specialized Court
should, through constitutional adjudication, enforce entrenched ESRs.
2.

International Protection of Rights in Palestine

The Palestinian Authority was created by the Oslo Accords in 1993, being
established as a non-sovereign entity with limited territorial, personal and
functional jurisdictions over parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip or the socalled ‘autonomous territories.’ By virtue of the fact that the ‘State of
Palestine’ (which the United Nations (UN) General Assembly recognized as a
non-member state in 2012(9)) is not (yet) a sovereign state, Israel is the only
(7) Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl, and Evan Rosevear, ‘Economic and Social Rights in National
Constitutions,’ Am. J. Comp. L. 62 (2014), 1054.
(8) King, ‘Introduction,’ 3.
(9) During September 2011, the PA president, who also serves as the Chairperson of the PLO
Executive Committee, presented a request for full UN membership to the UN Security Council.
In order to be successful, this request required the positive recommendation of a majority of
the Security Council (9 of its 15 members, including all five permanent members) and a twothird majority vote in the UNGA. The request was denied after it failed to secure the necessary
votes in the Security Council. For more about the context, see Michele K. Esposito, “Update on
Conflict and Diplomacy: 16 August 2011–15 November 2011,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 41,
no. 2 (2012), 153-89. In 2012, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution
(A/RES/67/19) on 29 November 2012 recognizing Palestine as a non-member state. There
were 138 states in favor, out of 193 member states of the UN, nine against, and 41
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sovereign state within historical Palestine. As the occupying power, the Israeli
government has repeatedly refused to uphold its treaty obligations with regard
to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), persistently refusing to even
reference its treaty obligations (to the Human Rights Committee and the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) within its national human
rights reports. This position has been diametrically opposed to the one
adopted by the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), both of whom have frequently reiterated
these obligations. It is also inconsistent with the position adopted by the
International Court of Justice in its famous advisory opinion of 2004.(10)
IHRL clearly establishes that the Palestinian Authority has obligations
towards the population under its direct control. However, until recently, it was
not accountable to CESCR for treaty-based ESRs, a situation which prevailed
while it was not a state authority with the commensurate ability to ratify
international human rights treaties.
When UN General Assembly Resolution (67/19 (November 29, 2012) UN
Doc A/RES/67/19.) recognised Palestine as a ‘Non-Member State’, it provided
the basis upon which the PA could ratify International treaties.(11) In the event
of ratification, the PA would be internationally accountable for the protection
of ESRs, despite the fact that it did not exert sovereign control over its claimed
abstentions.http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/19
(9) While there are clear differences between the South African apartheid regime and the
Palestinian occupation regime, I would be predisposed to suggest that the word ‘apartheid’
appropriately describes the prevailing status quo within the latter. In the absence of a more
appropriate analogue, ‘apartheid’ provides a sufficient substitute. For a discussion of the
apartheid paradigm and the rights discourse, see: Raef Zreik, ‘Palestine, Apartheid, and the
Rights Discourse,’ Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no. 1 (2004): 68-80.
(10) See, Maarten Den Heijer and Rick Lawson, ‘Extraterritorial Human Tights and the Concept
of 'Jurisdiction,’ in Malcolm Langford, Wouter Vandenhole, Martin Scheinin and Willem Van
Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 167-169.
In footnote 67 the author presents examples of concluding observations by the two
international committees.
(11) On April 1, 2014, the PA’s President ratified a number of treaties. These included: The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See: Dalia Hatuqa, ‘‘Paradigm shift’: Palestinians join
treaties,’ Al-Jazeera Network, 22 April 2014:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/shift-palestinians-join-treaties2014418111950813313.html
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territory and population. In 2014 this situation came to pass when the State of
Palestine ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR.
While there is (almost) a worldwide consensus that ESRs are human
rights,(12) it is important to acknowledge that both sets of rights (CPRs and
ESRs) were entrenched in two separate international covenants – the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Both
covenants, together with the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR),
constitute what has been referred to as the ‘International Bill of Rights’. (13)
Despite the fact that they are part of the same international regime, a
distinction is often drawn between ‘first generation’ rights (referring to CPRs)
and their ‘second generation’ (mainly ESRs) counterparts. While this distinction
may have served a function at the time of the drafting, it is now misleading;
after all, chronologically speaking, the two treaties were codified, ratified and
diffused almost in parallel. Given this, we are driven to enquire as to the basis
upon which the two set of rights continue to be distinguished. One plausible
explanation originates within the implementation of both sets of rights. After
all, ESRs require “affirmative government intervention in the economy”, in a
way that is not true of classical rights.(14) This distinction implicitly underpins
the categorisation, frequently reproduced within the scholarship on this
subject, of CPRs as negative rights and ESRs as positive rights.(15)
Upon the basis of this distinction we might justifiably infer that the
fulfilment of ESRs require resources and budgetary allocations from the state
while CPRs do not. However there are solid grounds for questioning this
inference. Firstly, CPRs often impact upon state budgets, most notably in the
costs associated with the provision of justice. It should also be recognised that
not all state obligations vis-à-vis ESRs are positive obligations. Quite the
contrary, the full realization of ESRs sometimes requires that states refrain
(12) King, ‘Introduction,’ 1.
(13) Although cultural rights and ESRs share a common regime, I will not engage the former in
any depth over the course of this paper.
(14) Mark Tushnet, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law,’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 1225-1258 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 1231.
(15) Ibid; David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, ‘The Evolution and Ideology of Global
Constitutionalism,’ California Law Review 99, no. 5 (2011): 1195.
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from undertaking specific courses of action: one example would be to refrain
from creating monopolies that render the right of adequate housing difficult to
fulfill, even for those who can afford it. This obligation exerts no direct impact
upon the state’s budget, but it is still necessary for the enjoyment of ESRs.
An alternative justification for the distinction of CPRs and ESRs can be found
within the level of urgency that we can ascribe to each referent object.
Whereas CPRs appear to impose immediate obligations on states, ESRs are
instead, by virtue of the fact that they are indirectly realized through specific
courses of action, programmatic. This interpretation finds further justification
within the precise wording of international treaties. Article Two of the ICCPR
establishes that: “Each state party… undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.”
Article 11.1 of the ICESR, on the other hand, maintains that: “The States
Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this
right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international cooperation based on free consent.” The United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights interpreted this to mean that states face
a “minimum core obligation,” which consists of a duty to “ensure the
satisfaction of, at very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights.”(16)
The United States of America(17) has historically been one of the leading
proponents of the division between human rights, being one of the few
countries to ratify ICCPR but not the ICESCR. This international position is
consistent with America’s domestic political arrangements, specifically the lack
of constitutional entrenchment of ESRs in the American constitution, and the
associated reluctance of the American legal system to view ESRs as justiciable.
(16) Sunstein, Designing Democracy, 229-30.
(17) Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem, ‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?
Social Rights in a New South African Constitution,’ U. Pa. L. Rev. 141 (1992), note 45, citing D.J.
Galligan. Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990), 19.
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In addition, the ICESR also enables States to accept an individual complaints
mechanism by ratifying an optional protocol – an innovation which is absent
from the ICCPR. This is another example which leads us to suspect that
different considerations pertain to the justiciability of ESRs and CPRs. (18) At the
current point in time, only 21 states are party to the optional protocol. The
‘State of Palestine’ did not ratify this protocol and nor did any of the Arab
countries, either before or after the Arab Spring. This leads us to infer that the
ratification of ICESCR by Palestinian representatives does not logically imply an
alteration within attitudes towards the justiciability of ESRs at the level of
international law.
3.

Constitutionally Entrenched Rights

In order to offset the risk of being sidetracked, it should be reiterated that
this paper is not concerned with Palestinian obligations that derive from
treaty-based ESRs. Even when we discussed above the impact of Palestine’s
ratification of international human rights treaties, we did not do so with the
intention of tracing the treaty-based obligations of Palestine with respect to
ESRs; rather, we were instead predisposed to identify if there was coherence
within Palestine’s international and domestic stance upon the justiciability of
ESRs.(19)
The PA had previously endorsed a Basic Law, which has the status of a
written and unified constitution that entrenched certain rights as fundamental
rights – in the words of the Basic Law, ‘public rights.’ This meant that the PA –
even before the UNGA’s reference to Palestine as a ‘non-member state’ –
acted as a state, acting in accordance with a binding written constitution and a
prior acceptance that fundamental rights need to be upheld and protected by
a constitutional text. To put it more concisely, the absence of sovereignty
wasn’t an obstacle to the PA’s entrenchment of ESRs.(20)
(18) Christian Courtis, Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Comparative Experiences of Justiciability (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists,
2008), 99, 20.
(19) This paper is not concerned with the sources (both domestic and international) of the
obligations that adhere to Israel as an occupation authority. A more sustained engagement
with this question would demand a very different kind of methodology. This framework would
provide a sounder basis for considering the obligations that international humanitarian law
and Israeli Basic Laws impose on the state of Israel with regard to Palestinian ESRs.
(20) This paper will set aside possible critiques of the viability of this approach. It will therefore
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However, it was not merely that the PA entrenched ESRs in the
constitutional text; the government even adopted the institution of
constitutional review of law and governmental actions by a Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC). In April 2016, President Mahmoud Abbas
nominated the SCC judges – thus reviving various controversies pertaining to
the legitimacy of the court, its independence and its legal, constitutional and
political significance within the PA system. Up until the formation of the SCC,
the High Court had been mandated to review cases of constitutionality. In this
capacity they even adjudicated upon a few cases, a number of which pertained
to entrenched rights in the Basic Law.
It is true that, up until the writing of this paper, there were no cases
involving entrenched ESRs. However, this doesn’t render the national case
study of Palestine on justiciability of ESRs less interesting: the lack of cases
doesn’t exclude the possibility that the SCC will be approached soon to decide
cases related to ESRs – a prospect which makes this paper more – not less –
pertinent. More importantly, the lack of case law by the SCC, the High Court, or
the High Court of Justice doesn’t mean that there are no legal disputes that are
related to ESRs. After all, a number of these disputes will not necessarily
culminate in court example – the example of the public school teachers being a
case-in-point.
On April 19, 2016, thousands of private sector workers took to the streets
to protest against the Decree Law pertaining to Social Security which had been
adopted by President Abbas on March 2, 2016.(21) The protesters had a
of objections concerning the preparation of the law (which had not been
preceded by public consultations or meetings with appointed representatives,
its endorsement (by Presidential decree-law, an innovation necessitated by the
fact that the Palestinian Legislative Council had not convened since 2007).
However, this was by no means an isolated occurrence - hundreds of decree
laws have been adopted since 2007 in similar contexts; they invariably aroused

assume that the lack of sovereignty isn’t an obstacle for the constitutional entrenchment of
ESRs; its analysis of whether or not those entrenched ESRs are justiciable will similarly overlook
the implications which this pronounced defect has for the enforceability of those rights.
(21) The Decree Law was not yet published in the Palestinian Gazette (official Journal) at the
time of writing. However a copy of the signed decree was made available by many sources,
including:
http://www.alhadath.ps/files/image/2016/3/19-3-2016/Social%20security.pdf
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criticism, however rarely did they mobilize the population or arouse
accusations that the proposed decree laws were unnecessary, illegitimate or
even unconstitutional. This raises the question of what was different in this
instance. As a starting point I would suggest that it was the content of the
decree law itself, which was widely denigrated as unsatisfactory, unacceptable
and unjust for workers.
In addressing ourselves to the initial question, the social unrest that
accompanied the public teachers’ strike and the adoption of the Social Security
Decree Law are just two of numerous possible examples that we could
potentially cite. In the absence of a case law, it will be necessary to legal and
constitutional disputes surrounding the justiciability of ESRs; this will ground
my argument that the Basic Law contains the basis for an understanding of
some ESRs as justiciable rights; this raises the prospect that the SCC may use
these entrenched ESRs to play an active role in easing the tension surrounding
those legal disputes by offering an interpretation of the constitutional
obligations that adhere to the Palestinian Authority. This will be a significant
development even if enforcement is advanced incrementally. This is of course
not a prediction; rather, it is instead my own interpretation of the ways that
ESRs can be entrenched in a manner that advances their justiciability in
Palestine.
A clear challenge can be perceived when we depart from those legal and
constitutional disputes which are obviously related to ESRs; at the point when
this paper was written, no one had approached the SCC with a view to
establishing whether public school teachers have protected economic rights.
Similarly, the counsel of the SCC has not been sought upon the Social Security
Decree Law. I will subsequently argue that the lack of submissions that have
been made to the SCC do not undermine the proposition that entrenched ESRs
are justiciable. For the sake of argument, let us begin by advancing a
hypothetical suggestion that will help us to formulate the central research
questions more clearly... Let us suppose that public school teachers, or the
workers in the private sector, or their representatives,(22) had actually decided
(22) One of the commissioners of the Palestinian Ombudsman, The Independent Commission
for Human Rights (ICHR), recently said in an interview that the ICHR may represent the
teachers, taking their case forward with a view to suing the government. See:
http://www.arn.ps/archives/177599. However, it appears that the ICHR’s central concern is
the not the violation of ESRs but rather the teachers’ right to strike.
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to approach the SCC, advancing the complaint that the government’s actions in
the two relevant instances are unconstitutional because they undermine
constitutional and employment rights.
In addressing ourselves to this hypothetical scenario, we should begin by
enquiring as to the arguments that can be made with regard to the
justiciability of ESRs in Palestine; once this question is addressed, we should
then consider their application to the working context. This leads us to ask the
following questions: Do public school teachers have a fundamental right to fair
wages and a right to adequate standard of living? Do workers in private sector
have a right to social security? How can a fair regulation of those matters be
decided, and what is the balance between the workers’ and the employers’
needs on the one side, and the government’s available resources on the other?
I do not intend to provide answers to these questions using the relevant
examples – this would be a redundant enterprise given their limited theoretical
and analytical utility(23). Instead, this paper turns its attention to a more
fundamental, and essentially prior, question: Are ESRs (in general terms) and
work-related rights (in more specific terms) justiciable in Palestine?
4.

Aspirational and Justiciable ESRs

Most constitutions now include a list of fundamental rights. In this respect
the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority is no different.(24) CPRs and ESRs are
(23) It is not the author’s concern to go into details of the specific articles that the protestors
were objecting to in the decree law, the specific requests made by public school teachers or
the question of how Palestinian law deals with those matters generally. Equally, I do not intend
to engage with the question of how the SCC will specifically respond to complaints that it
receives. While these questions are of general interest, they have little or no theoretical or
comparative utility. Rather, this article instead begins from an assumption that these events
have an illustrative value, thereby helping to provide the basis for a theoretical discussion that
engages with the justiciability of ESRs in Palestine and the role of the SCC in enforcing ESRs.
(24) The Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority entered into force in 2002. In 2003, a new
amended version of the Basic Law was adopted. In instances where this paper cites the Basic
Law, it is referring to the 2003 version. There are potentially various arguments against the
consideration of the Basic Law as the supreme Law in the territories under the PA jurisdiction
and the non-state status of the Palestinian Authority itself. This paper aligns itself with the
position of the High Court, which acts in the capacity of a Supreme Constitutional Court. It
therefore assumes that the Basic Law is – or acts like – a constitution and the PA is – or has the
structure of – a quasi-state. For more about the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority, see:
Asem Khalil, ‘Beyond the Written Constitution: Constitutional Crisis of, and the Institutional
Deadlock in, the Palestinian Political System as Entrenched in the Basic Law,’ International
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[Courting Economic and Social Rights in Palestine]
listed under the same title in the Basic Law of 2003 – it should, however, be
acknowledged that both are referred to as ‘public rights and freedoms’
(articles 9-33) and not as ‘fundamental rights and freedoms.(25)
Article 10 of the Basic Law establishes that “[f]undamental human rights
and freedoms shall be protected and respected” before positing that “[t]he
Palestinian National Authority shall work without delay to become a party to
regional and international declarations and covenants that protect human
rights.”(26) It is characteristic of the Basic Law in that it confers a general
protection upon internationally recognized human rights. It should be noted,
however, that this article does not establish the supremacy of International
human rights treaties over national laws, let alone over the Basic Law. Article 9
outlines equally clear stipulations upon equality, another key component of
liberal constitutionalism, when it establishes that: “Palestinians shall be equal
before the law and the judiciary, without distinction based upon race, sex,
color, religion, political views or disability.”
Some CPRs and ESRs are then listed under ‘Public Rights and Freedoms’,
although it should be noted that the Basic Law uses different formats to refer
to different rights. The distinction between aspirational and justiciable rights
cannot be deduced from the words used in the Basic Law alone; (27) however,
Journal of Constitutional Law 11 (2013): 34-73.
(25) It is not our concern in this paper to discuss whether this was the result of a conscious
choice by the drafters of this constitution-like text, or whether they, in the age of
constitutional plagiarism, produced the text by chance. As Langford rightly observes: “In other
instances, economic, social and cultural rights were made justiciable almost accidentally
(constitutions were copied from other jurisdictions)] or international treaties were
incorporated in the constitutional order with no public pressure.” Malcolm Langford, ‘The
Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory,’ in Malcolm Langford (ed.), Social Rights
Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law, 3-45 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 30. For a general discussion about the Basic Law and the
unsuccessful constitutional borrowing, see: Khalil, ‘Beyond,’ 34-73.
(26) It is often the case that the word أساسيةis translated as ‘basic’, with reference to rights and
freedoms. In this article, I prefer to use ‘fundamental’ which is another translation for the
same Arabic word. The same applies to حريات, which is often translated as ‘liberties’, and which
I translate as ‘freedoms’. Unless otherwise specified, the non-official translation of the Basic
Law of 2003 that I refer to in this paper is available (upon registration) at Birzeit University’s
collection of Palestinian legislation and courts decisions,)Al-muqtafi(.
http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/en/Legislation/GetLegFT.aspx?LegPath=2003&MID=14138
(27) This assumes, of course, that the other elements – which will be discussed in the following
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the precise drafting of a specific right does provide us with considerable insight
into the levels of status that the Basic Law ascribes to different ESRs.
Article 22 of the Basic Law states that Social, health, disability and
retirement security(28) shall be regulated by law before establishing that
“[m]aintaining the welfare of families of martyrs, prisoners of war, the injured
and the disabled is a duty that shall be regulated by law. The [Palestinian]
National Authority shall guarantee these persons’ education, health and social
insurance.” Article 25 sets out equally vague stipulations upon employment
rights. Upon the subject of housing, however, the Basic Law is considerably
more explicit, with Article 23 clearly establishing that “[e]very citizen shall have
the right to proper housing”, adding that the “Palestinian National Authority
shall secure housing for those who are without shelter.”(29) Article 24 is equally
forthcoming in outlining specific educational obligations(30) while Article 29 is
equally precise upon the subject of children’s rights.(31)
Largely drawing upon the methodology used in a recent comparative study
of different constitutions,(32) I will now discuss the status of ESRs in the
Palestinian Authority’s Basic Law of 2003, being careful to draw a clear
distinction between absent, aspirational and justiciable rights. With a view to
this end, I tentatively distinguish 16 ESRs, seven of which are economic rights
(rights connected to work condition or status). The remaining nine are social
rights and therefore apply to all citizens. The following table sets out, in my
own assessment, the different ESRs within the 2003 Basic Law.

sections – for justiciablity exist (in particular the institution of judicial review and possibility of
recourse to the court in case of violation of recognized and protected ESRs).
(28) I use social security instead of social insurance (which is used in the unofficial translation
of the Basic law that I refer to).
(29) Emphasis added.
(30) Article 24: “1. Every citizen shall have the right to education…”
(31) Article 29: “Maternal and childhood welfare are national duties. Children shall have the
right to…”.
(32) Jung, Hirschl, and Rosevear, ‘Economic and Social Rights,’ 1049.
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ECONOMIC
RIGHTS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
SOCIAL RIGHTS

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
A
B
C

For Workers only

The Basic Law of the
Palestinian Authority

Fair wage
Trade Union/ Workers’ Union
Strike
Rest and Leisure
Standard of Living
Safe and healthy work environment
Social security related to employment
For all citizens, regardless of work status
Social security not related to employment
(old-age pension, disability, welfare)
Financial support to vulnerable groups
Rights of children
Health
Citizen’s access to land (right to
property)
Housing
Food and Water
Education
Detainee Rights
Non existent
Standard: Recognized vaguely, or as a
standard, or left for the law to regulate
Justiciable: Recognized explicitly as a
justiciable right

A

B

C

X
Art 25
Art 25
Art 25
Art 25
Art 25
Art 25

X
X
X
X
X
X

Art 22

X
X

Art 29

X
X

Art 21

X

Art 23

X
X

Art 24

X
X

A quick scan of the preceding table shows that the Palestinian Basic Law
follows the general pattern evidenced within the comparative study of 195
national constitutions.(33) While it should first be acknowledged that it is
normal to entrench ESRs in national constitutions, it is also important to
recognise that ESRs are not equally widespread. The Palestinian Basic Law
establishes a right to education(34), a right which is so widespread as to be
practically universal. The Basic Law’s oversight of food and water(35) is
reproduced within constitutions across the world. Upon this basis we can infer
(33) Ibid., 1046-7.
(34) For a discussion of the right of education as a human right in Palestine, see: ‘The Right to
Education in Palestine,’ OECD Journal on Development 9, no. 2 (2008): 119-131.
(35) For a presentation of the issue of water as a human right in Palestine, see: Simone
Klawitter, ‘Water as a Human Right: The Understanding of Water Rights in Palestine,’ Water
Resources Development 23, no. 2 (2007): 303–327.
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that it is wrong to continue talking about ESRs as a block of second generation
rights; by logical extension, it is equally inappropriate to view them as positive
rights requiring the same amount of obligatory actions by the state. (36)
Second, it is important to recognise that constitutions accord ESRs different
statuses or strengths.(37) Upon closer reflection, it appears that Palestine
adopted a mixed system, which brought together aspirational and justiciable
rights. Five rights are absent (including the right to fair wage, the right to
health, and food and water); two rights (children’s rights and education) are
potentially, under certain circumstances, justiciable; meanwhile, nine rights
can, upon the basis that they provide standards or guidelines for government
actions, be considered aspirational.
Third, it should be recognized that the Basic Law includes a reasonable
amount of aspirational and justiciable ESRs. Taking into account the fact the
foundations of this law (a mixture of civil law and Islamic tradition), it is
instructive to reflect that most economic rights, in particular those related to
working conditions(38) are, at best, aspirational. Finally, the Basic Law’s broad
entrenchment of aspirational rights with few justiciable rights corresponds to
the more general pattern within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). (39)
5.

Constitutional Review in Palestine

The Palestinian Authority, having been strongly influenced by the Egyptian
example,(40) opted for the judicial review model that is often adopted in civil law
countries. It therefore put in place a specialized court that was entrusted with the
mandate to review the constitutionality of laws and the government’s actions.(41) This
model of constitutional review is coherent with Palestine’s legal system. It is
essentially a civil law country – this means that the decentralized judicial review
(36) Jung, Hirschl, and Rosevear, ‘Economic and Social Rights,’ 1046.
(37) Ibid., 1046-7.
(38) For more about the Palestinian Labor law on the light of international standards, see:
Mutaz Qafisheh, ‘The Inte play between International Human Rights and Labour Rights in
Palestine,’ J. Islamic St. Prac. Int'l L. 9, no. 1 (2013): 121-164.
(39) Jung, Hirschl, and Rosevear, ‘Economic and Social Rights,’1069.
(40) For a general presentation of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, see Kevin Boyle,
Human rights and democracy: the role of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt (Kluwer
Law International, 1996); Lama Abu Odeh, ‘The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt: The
Limits of Liberal Political Science and CLS Analysis of Law Elsewhere’ AM. J. COMP. L. 59 (2011),
985-1008.
(41) In this paper, I refer to this method of judicial review as “constitutional review.”
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system used in many common law countries is pre-emptively excluded as a suitable
option. It is similarly closely aligned with its historical legacy. Palestine has not been
subject – in clear opposition to the examples of Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia by the
French model, in which constitutional review is put into effect by Constitutional
Council. Finally, this model is increasingly widespread across the region. After the
Arab Spring, it was reinforced within countries that are familiar with this institution
(such as Egypt)(42) and those which have historically been more immune to its
attractions.

Articles 103 and 104 of the 2003 Basic Law set out the basic structure and
mandate of the ‘Supreme Constitutional Court’ (SCC), while affirming that it
will be established by an organic law. Up until the point at which the SCC was
established, the High Court was temporarily entrusted with all the duties
assigned to the Supreme Constitutional Court (see Article 104). In
acknowledging the High Court in this temporary capacity, I will refer to it as the
‘Acting SCC’.
The ‘Law Establishing a Supreme Constitutional Court’ (hereafter the ‘2006
SCC Law’) was adopted four years after the Basic Law came into force. The
Acting SCC didn’t need to wait until this law was adopted before acting as a
constitutional court, and indeed this was not the case. Citing its mandate
established within the Basic Law, the Acting SCC abrogated a 2005 decree law,
adopted by President Abbas, which pertained to the judicial authority.(43)
A prima facie analysis of the Basic Law establishes that: 1) the SCC is the
only court with the mandate to review legislation and government’s actions,
(42) Constitutional Courts after the Arab Spring: Appointment mechanisms and relative judicial
independence (Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law & Center for Constitutional
Transitions and International IDEA, 2014).
(43) The SCC was mandated with many other prerogatives; for the purposes of this paper, our
interest will be limited to the mandate to review the constitutionality of “laws, bylaws or
regulations, and others,” and to the “interpretation of the Basic Law.” Article 103 used the
word غيها,
 رleaving the article open to interpretation, potentially extending the SCC’s mandate
to acts that are not necessarily legislative in nature. This can be contrasted with a narrow
interpretation, based on the “same kind” rule of interpretation. A narrow interpretation may
be preferred if we take in consideration article 24 of the SCC Law which limited the SCC
mandate to laws and regulations. However, again, article 27.2 takes us back to the wider
interpretation. Article 27.1 refers, besides the law, to the control of constitutionality of any
‘action’. This confusion is attributable, in part, to the author’s understanding to the way the
Basic law and laws generally are drafted – this often occurs by copying and pasting from other
jurisdictions, invariably without due consideration for overall coherence.
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thus ensuring that entrenched ESRs are upheld and respected; 2) The Acting
SCC perceived entrenched rights to be justiciable rights; upon this basis, it
seems reasonable to infer that the newly formed SCC will share this attitude
towards entrenched rights;(44) 3) That in instances where there is disagreement
over the legal significance of a specific right (e.g. whether the Basic Law
establishes a justiciable right or a standard), it is the SCC that is mandated to
establish the correct interpretation; 4) with regard to ESRs that are not
formally entrenched within the Basic Law, it is the SCC that will determine the
sources of ‘constitutionality’ means: there is nothing that limits the SCC’s
consideration of constitutionality to the Basic Law alone.
However, while the SCC is empowered to review the constitutionality of a
specific measure, it is the courts who decide in instances where damages have
been incurred as a result of an unconstitutional legislation or other actions
upon the part of the government (Article 25.3 of the SCC Law). Article 41.1 of
the SCC law clearly establishes that: “The judgments of the Court on
constitutional actions and its decisions concerning interpretation shall be
binding to all the authorities of the State and to the public.” Article 25
establishes that a ruling of unconstitutionality does not directly abrogate the
legislation or action, but instead renders them unenforceable. Upon this basis,
the same authority that issued the legislation or action is invited to amend or
abrogate it.
Article 106 of the 2003 Basic Law did not clarify who can approach the SCC with
a view to asking it to remedy an unconstitutional act of government. In its 2005
ruling (5/2005), the Acting SCC agreed to look into the case filed by the Arab
Lawyers' Association for Human Rights (an NGO registered in Gaza), citing the
general rules governing a party’s right to file a case by way of an original action.
With the adoption of the SCC Law, this is no longer a problem. Article 27.1 of
the SCC Law explicitly recognizes a right for “any aggrieved person” to register a
case. This establishes a very broad remit, making it possible to file a case of
unconstitutionality even in cases that go beyond the violation of fundamental
rights and freedoms that are protected by the Basic Law. This attribute is
problematically reconciled with comparative constitutional experiences. In those
instances where this right is recognised, it is frequently subject to certain
conditions, such as the requirement that the perceived damage can be
(44) Of course, the way a right is entrenched and the words used are relevant to the court’s
ultimate conclusion. See Langford, ‘The Justiciability,’ 30.
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demonstrated to have negatively impacted a fundamental right or freedom.

Article 27 proceeds to set out other ways in which constitutional objections
can be registered: (1) Referral to the SCC for unconstitutionality by any court, if
the “law, bylaw, decree, bylaw, regulation or decision is necessary for the
adjudication of the dispute.” (2) Indirect attack by any of the parties in a case
that is being heard before a court, if the court finds the rebuttal of
unconstitutionality is serious. (3) By the SCC itself in its review of a case and
during the proceeding in the dispute. There is nothing in the Basic or SCC Law
to suggest that the SCC has discretion to choose not to decide a case if it is
submitted through one of the aforementioned procedures.
Taking in consideration the large mandate of the SCC and the fact that any
aggrieved person has recourse to seek remedies from the SCC, it would be
expected that the SCC would have addressed itself to numerous instances in
which fundamental rights and freedoms, including ESRs, had been violated.
However, closer inspection reveals that this has not proven to be the case. In
actual fact, since its mandate was first established, the acting SCC adjudicated
upon very few cases.
A revision of the decisions adopted so far by the Acting SCC indicates the
following points:(45) (1) there was a relatively small number of cases (this
feature is particularly striking given the expansive scope of the adopted system
(45) These are the cases the author was able to collect (they have not yet been authoritatively
published by the judiciary): (1) Constitutional Complaint (n 5) of 2005 that abrogated a new
judiciary law; (2) Constitutional Complaint (n 1) of 2006 that cancelled PLC decisions; (3)
Constitutional Complaint (n 1) of 2009 which was related to Military Courts that still apply
(PLO) Revolutionary Penal Codes. (4) Constitutional Complaint (n 3) of 2009 objecting the
constitutionality of Decree Law (n 17) of 2009, that regulates dealings in foreign stock
exchange; (5) Constitutional Complaint (n 2) of 2010, objecting the constitutionality of PLO’s
Revolutionary Penal Code and Penal Procedures of 1979; (6) Constitutional Complaint (n 3) of
2010, objecting the constitutionality of the prosecution for personal status issues, in particular
their decision to annul a marriage because of apostasy; (7) Constitutional Complaint (n 2) of
2011, objecting the constitutionality of PLO’s Revolutionary Penal Code and Penal Procedures
of 1979; (8) Constitutional Complaint (n 6) of 2012, objecting the President’s decision to lift the
parliamentary immunity from Mohammad Dahlan; (9) Constitutional Complaint (n 1) of 2013,
objecting the constitutionality of inclusion of religion in the ID; (10) Constitutional Complaint (n
1) of 2014, objecting the constitutionality of Jordanian Laws that are in force in the West Bank.
Interestingly, with the exception of the two first complaints discussed in this paper (n 5 of
2005, and n 1 of 2006), the high court, in its capacity as Supreme Constitutional Court, simply
rejected the case, mostly grounding its decision within formalities.
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of judicial review); (2) In most cases, the preference of the Acting SCC was to
avoid the substance of the matter, frequently using formal irregularities as an
excuse for dropping the case. (3) The Acting SCC considers the Basic Law to be
the ‘Constitution’ of the Palestinian Authority; by virtue of this ascribed trait,
any legislation or action that contradicts the Basic Law is unconstitutional. (4)
The Acting SCC confirms the right of any aggrieved person to file a case and
seek remedy from the court. (5) Nothing in the Acting SCC’s decisions suggests
that there is any fundamental difference between its treatment of the rights
included in the Basic Law and any other rule or principle contained within this
same source. It will be noted that there were few cases that referred to the
obligatory character of Human Rights (article 10) or to specific CPRs. However,
as mentioned earlier, there appear to be no litigation cases relating to ESRs.
Taking in account the generous provisions that the Basic Law makes for the
justiciability of fundamental rights and freedoms in general, it is puzzling why
no cases concerning ESR rights were directed towards the Acting SCC. Taking
into account the two examples cited at the beginning of this paper, this puzzle
becomes still more perplexing.(46) However it is not my concern to establish
why individuals do not file claims or orientate towards the SCC to enforce their
justiciable ESRs, placing particular emphasis upon rights entrenched within the
Basic Law. While this question remains open, it is nonetheless possible to
assert, with a considerably greater degree of certainty, that its existence does
not demonstrate that that ESRs are not justiciable in Palestine. Justiciability
does not depend on the effective exercise of aggrieved parties of their right to
claim remedy for a violation of a constitutionally protected right – rather, it
instead depends on the existence of the possibility.
This raises the question of whether, in the event that the newly formed SCC
was approached in a case involving ESRs, whether it would be willing to
exercise its role and become involved in their enforcement? In the account
that I have outlined, it is not necessary for ESRs to be enforced by the SCC in
order for them to be considered justiciable. After all, in cases involving the
enforcement of CPRs, the court appears to implicitly accept their justiciability
(this is unavoidable given their entrenchment in the Basic Law) but find ways
not to enforce them.
(46) I would be tempted to speculate that this can be partially explained by the lack of
confidence in Palestinian Authority’s institutions generally, and constitutional review in
particular. The practice of the Acting SCC adds further weight to this speculation.
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Let us consider the hypothetical proposition of workers approaching the
SCC for remedy with reference to the two examples cited in the introduction of
this article, both of which are essentially concerned with economic rights. In
the two examples, the SCC will address itself to three questions: 1) what is,
taking into account its constitutional entrenchment within the Basic Law, the
content of the right to work? 2) What limits are imposed on political
institutions (the legislature and the government) in the regulation of the workrelated rights? 3) Taking into consideration the overall political, social and
economic context of Palestine, to what extent is it appropriate for the SCC to
enforce these justiciable rights?
For the SCC, the first obvious approach – taking into account the earlier
discussion of the constitutional entrenchment of ESRs – is to establish the
position of the Basic Law upon the right to work and the related rights of
workers. This is relatively straightforward, as Article 25 of the Basic Law clearly
establishes that: “1. Every citizen shall have the right to work, which is a duty
and honor. The Palestinian National Authority shall strive to provide work for
any individual capable of performing it. 2. Work relations shall be organized in
a manner that guarantees justice to all and provides workers with welfare,
security, and health and social benefits. 3. Organization of unions is a right that
shall be regulated by the law. 4. The right to conduct a strike shall be exercised
within the limits of the law.”
The right to work is explicitly and clearly outlined. It is impossible for the
SCC not to take such a right into account when it is so explicitly indicated
within the Basic Law. However, the redaction of the remainder of the article
reinforces the view that, rather than being justiciable, employment rights are,
at best, aspirational. One way to engage with this puzzle would be to suggest
that the legislator and the government have obligations towards citizens who
enjoy a ‘right to work.’ It would indeed be difficult to see how the SCC could
argue against this, as it is explicitly stated within the Basic Law. However, it is
quite another thing to argue that the entrenchment of a ‘right to work’ is itself
sufficient to claim that there are specific legal obligations that derive from
constitutionally protected employment rights. There are accordingly strong
grounds for suspecting that the entrenched employment rights are instead
aspirational. Furthermore, there is an equally strong basis for suspecting that
the SCC will share this conclusion, thus leaving it to the government and the
legislature to uphold their obligations towards citizens, thereby ensuring that
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they are in a position to exercise their right to work. In the case of education
the SCC may reach a different conclusion, in large part due to the way that this
right is entrenched, a consideration which has strong implications for the
constitutional obligations placed upon the Palestinian government.
6.

Arguments against the Justiciability of ESRs in Palestine

In order to militate against the risk of over-simplifying, it needs to be
recognized that the situation is considerably more complicated than we have
hitherto acknowledged. In addition to the practical obstacles that impede the
justiciability of ESRs in Palestine, there are also strong arguments against this
course of action – importantly, these apply even in instances where the
constitution wording provides a narrative that is prima facie supportive of
justiciable ESRs. These arguments are of course stronger in cases where
specific rights have been redacted in a way that suggests they are aspirational
or are absented from the constitutional text. I will now proceed to set out
some of the possible arguments that may be used against the justiciability of
constitutionally entrenched rights and against their enforcement by the SCC
through the institution of constitutional review.
Argument One: The Constitution Does not have to protect all Rights and
Interests
This proposition is easy to summarise: A democratic constitution does not –
and is not expected to – protect every right and interest that should be
protected in a decent or just society.(47)
The obvious response to this argument is that even if constitutions don’t
have to, they simply do protect some ESRs. The 2003 Basic Law’s explicit
reference to some ESRs appears to suggest that it is receptive to some kind of
protection of work-related rights. In this respect we can distinguish other
rights that remained outside the text of the Basic Law. The basis of their
justiciability rests upon a fundamentally different line of argument which falls
far beyond the parameters of the current paper.
The argument against justiciability does not collapse at this point but finds
renewed impetus with the suggestion that the constitutional entrenchment of
ESRs doesn’t mean that the SCC should substitute for constituted authorities
(the government and the legislator) in the organization of the working context.
(47) Source of arguments 1-3 below are: Sunstein, Designing Democracy, 222 -235.
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However, this is transparently not the argument that is being made upon
behalf of justiciability. Even its strongest advocates would not attempt to
uphold the proposition that the SCC should replace the government or
regulators in the regulation of the workplace. Clearly, entrusting constituted
authorities with the task of government is one thing while ‘keeping an eye’ (of
which constitutional review is but one example) is another.
A further point of objection may be found within the argument that the
proposed measure betrays a lack of trust within politicians and in politics more
generally. They, the argument holds, are best-placed to manage these social
and economic rights and interests. Constitutions should be focused upon more
elevated matters, such as the constitution and dispersal of political and legal
authority. Upon attending to our immediate preoccupation, we can set aside
this line of argument upon the basis that it does not argue against the general
or specific (work-related rights in Palestine) justiciability of ESRs. Taking the
basic law as our point of reference, it is sufficient to assert that the inclusion of
certain ESRs in the canonical text requires, from a constitutional law
perspective, the SCC to give these entrenched ESRs due consideration.
Setting aside these setbacks, the argument may then proceed to suggest
that the legacies of the past make it incumbent upon the court to refuse the
justiciability claim of ESRs. However, a legacy of past injustice is often precisely
the basis upon which the court can claim an active role. In South Africa, for
example, we would expect the constitutional court to assess the right to
housing (along with its accompanying disputes) with reference to the legacy of
apartheid South Africa, whose influence is still perceptible within the acute
housing shortage that afflicts many parts of the nation. It is unrealistic to
suggest that these legacies of the past can be overcome by day-to-day politics,
a point which is further reiterated by the fact that the new South African
constitution takes the destruction of apartheid’s poisonous legacy as its
overarching goal.
I would therefore suggest that it is appropriate to invert the initial
argument. Rather than considering the legacies of the past, and the economic
inequalities of the present as reasons to object justiciability of work-related
rights in Palestine, it is instead the case that both should be considered to
provide an addition justification for the SCC to make a contextualized
judgment upon those rights. In doing so, it should take into account the
ongoing Israeli occupation, the limited authority of the Palestinian Authority
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and the pervasive fragmentation of Palestinian land and population. This of
course imposes an added layer of complexity onto an already complex matter;
however, complexity in itself is not an argument against the justiciability of
ESRs in Palestine.
Argument Two: The Constitution Should Protect Real Rights or Otherwise All
Constitutional Rights Will Be Jeopardized
In advancing this line of argument, its adherents contend that the central
function of the constitution is to prevent the abusive or oppressive exercise of
government power. Proceeding by logical extension we can infer that only
CPRs should be included in the constitution, as the constitution needs to
protect individuals against the aggressive state. The premise that the
constitution should provide for private entitlements to protection by the state
is thereby comprehensively refuted. At its furthest point of extension this
argument suggests that the inclusion of ESRs could potentially jeopardize
constitutional rights altogether. In the unhappy event that certain ESRs are
already in place, then the courts should not enforce them or even recognize
them as justiciable rights, with a view to protecting and promoting ‘real’ rights.
This line of argument is of course proceeded by a prior assumption, namely
that CPRs are negative rights and ESRs are positive rights – both terms being
understood as the respective poles of a spectrum structured around state
involvement in the satisfaction of those rights. The posited binary opposition is
of course deeply problematic – after all, many CPRs, such as the right to
property and freedom of speech and movement, require certain amount of
government actions. At the same time, many ‘positive’ rights, such as the right
to adequate standard of living, require the government to respect individual
freedoms, thereby resisting the temptation to impose monopolies on certain
products, goods, or services.
Article 25 of the Basic Law further reiterates this essential point. While
paragraphs one and two prescribe positive actions by the government, the
rights that are set out within paragraphs three and four (which relate to rights
of collective organisation and the withdrawal of labor) are deemed to be
‘negative rights’ (i.e. in the sense that they do not involve direct intervention
by the government. However, this distinction is difficult to sustain. Upon
precisely what basis can we distinguish work-related ESRs rights from CPRs
that are necessary for the satisfaction of the same (constitutionally protected)
‘right to work’?
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It may be argued that the satisfaction of the positive rights requires
resources which are often lacking; by logical extension, ESRs shouldn’t, by
virtue of the pressures that they place on limited resources, be included in the
Constitution. Even if they are present, they should not be enforced by the
court, upon the basis that it is technically incapable and lacking in democratic
legitimacy – the balancing of public resources and national priorities instead
being the purview of the politician.
However, this line of argument fails to militate against the inclusion of ESRs.
After all, the satisfaction of many negative rights, such as the access to justice
for example, requires substantial resources, often accounting for a
considerable part of any state’s budget. If we were to follow this line of
argument to its logical conclusion, then the whole human rights protection
regime will collapse. In conclusion, the argument is also refuted by the fact
that: a) The Basic Law is drafted in a way that includes a protection regime for
some fundamental rights and freedoms; b) because Palestinians adopted the
institution of constitutional review, setting the many theoretical arguments
(some of which are sound) that suggested the opposite course of action.
Argument Three: The Government Can Meet People’s Needs in Various
Other Ways
It is clearly the case that we cannot simultaneously criticize a government’s
abuse of negative rights while at the same time accepting a situation in which
its people’s minimal needs are not met. The argument against responds by
suggesting that there are other ways, aside from justiciability and
enforceability, in which people’s needs can be met. One way would be to
provide incentives which ensure that people are able to empower themselves.
Democratic – as opposed to constitutional – innovations would be optimal in
this regard. Again, it is the attempt to construct a false binary that is inherently
problematic. The inclusion of certain ESRs in the constitution is not intended to
substitute for democratic tools. These rights do not preempt democratic
deliberation but help to provide political impetus, directing attention to
important issues that might otherwise be neglected or overlooked. These
rights also feed into democratic deliberation, ensuring that the overall
democratic process is strengthened and consolidated. This sustained
interlinkage of political and economic rights provides a strong rebuttal to those
who continue to counsel in favor of a delimited ‘safety net’ model. The
essential argument that could be made is that democracy requires a certain
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independence and security for everyone; especially – but crucially not only –
those in desperate conditions.
It is also important to recognise that the Palestinian democratic process
(free elections were held in 1996 2006) is irrevocably stalled. The PLC is
currently incapable even of meeting, let alone legislating or exercising
oversight over the incumbent government. Since 2007 the actions of
successive Palestinian governments have not been subject to the approval of
the PLC. Annual budgets have similarly escaped scrutiny with President Abbas
effectively ruling through executive decrees. Given this complete absence of
oversight and accountability, it is fundamentally flawed to attempt to advance
an argument against the SCC upon the grounds of democratic deficiency or to
argue that the SCC is democratically deficient.
Argument Four: ESRs that are included will not be enforced by the courts
It is possible to oppose the justiciability of ESRs on the basis that ESRs have
a political dimension and accordingly should be left to political institutions to
decide. While it is a legitimate concern to distinguish the political aspects of a
right, it is now widely accepted that many political mattes – including matters
related to the separation of powers, electoral inequalities, etc. – can be
legitimately subject to constitutional adjudication.(48)
Even so – the argument goes on – it is possible that the courts would prefer
to refrain from enforcing ESRs even if they may be entrenched in the
constitutional text. In the first instance this may be due to the indeterminacy
of the referent object; in the second instance, it may be due to the court’s own
lack of democratic legitimacy and institutional capacity.(49) In the Palestinian
context, both factors may go some way towards explaining why the Acting SCC
has evidenced such restraint with regard to the enforcement of entrenched
rights. This concern about institutional capacity is often linked into the fear
that any attempt by the courts to assume a managerial role will bring the
whole constitutional process into question and possibly even contribute to
contestation and even challenge.(50) The argument proceeds to suggest that it
not for the courts to assume this managerial function, to determine the

(48) Antonio Carlos Pereira-Menaut, ‘Against Positive Rights,’ Val. U. L. Rev. 22 (1987-1988): 378.

(49) Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights,’ 408.
(50) Sunstein, Designing Democracy, 223.
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allocation of scarce resources or to rank priorities.(51)
It should be acknowledged that the entrenchment of ESRs does not
necessarily imply that the courts will enforce them. This point is reiterated by
the example of India, where it was the legislature, not the judiciary that was
explicitly entrusted with enforcement.(52) In those instances where the
constitution is unclear or indecisive, it is true that the courts sometimes
choose not to actively enforce ESRs (as was the case of the Acting SCC). In
some instances, this may be attributable to a prior understanding that their
role is limited to strictly legal matters; in others, it may instead derive from a
desire to avoid sanctions or repercussions from other branches of government
or the general public.(53)
However, closer examination of the empirical record throughout the world
shows that this reluctance and reticence is not widely evidenced. Quite the
contrary, courts have frequently adopted a variety of approaches in order to
enforce and reinforce ESRs. The individual or negative enforcement models, in
addition to the weak enforcement model, provide examples of ESRs
enforcement that do not necessitate large-scale intervention in public
policy.(54) Conceivably, the SCC could draw upon any number of these models
as well, doing so in the knowledge that it would be unlikely to incur the wrath
or consternation of the executive authority.

(51) Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights,’ 406-7.
(52) Sunstein, Designing Democracy, 224.
(53) Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights,’ 406-7.
(54) Ibid., 407-408.
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7.

Conclusion

In drawing upon the conclusions of comparative theoretical and empirical
constitutional studies on ESRs, we can conclude by offering a number of
prescriptive conclusions that argue in favor of the constitutionalization of ESRs,
thereby reiterating the need for these rights to be justiciable and upheld by a
specialized constitutional court (i.e. SCC). In advancing these conclusions, I further
underline the SCC’s ability to enforce and uphold the referent ESRs.
In the case of Palestine, it can be strongly argued that some ESRs (such as the
right to education, the right to adequate housing and children rights) are
justiciable. This assertion is sustained by the observation that these rights are
entrenched in the constitutional text and theoretically (in lieu of empirical
confirmation) protected by the SCC’s mandate of constitutional review and the
individual’s right to claim and uphold these rights. There are, however, a number
of complicating factors in this regard – these include the language of the Basic Law
(which reinforces the impression of standards or guidelines for government
action) and the pronounced absence of some ESRs.
Arguments against the enforceability of rights by courts that find grounding
within democratic deficiencies and institutions inadequacies are, as we have
already seen, deeply problematic. Various apex courts enforce ESRs in various
ways and at different levels; besides, the same courts may enforce ESRs
differently over time.
A realist analysis of the current status of rights within the territories under the
Palestinian Authority’s jurisdiction may suggest a pessimistic view about the
possible involvement of the SCC in the enforcement of ESRs in Palestine. This
pessimistic appraisal would be further reinforced by the limited role of
constitutional adjudication (refer to the Acting SCC) and doubts with regard to the
legitimacy of the SCC’s nominated judges in the SCC. On a more optimistic note,
there is no reason why the disillusioning state of current affairs should necessarily
prevail into the future. If the SCC decides to perform its duties, as suggested by
this paper, the Basic Law provides the basis for such a transformation. In the event
of a more active engagement upon the part of the SCC, various entry points for
the enforceability of justiciable ESRs in Palestine present themselves.
(1) This can be achieved by directly enforcing ESRs that are entrenched in the
Basic Law, indirectly connecting them to CPRs or even by making reference to the
equality clause in general.
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(2) This can also be achieved by using the general reference to Human Rights
in Article 10 of the Basic Law, making use of the obligation to respect and uphold
these internationally recognized rights. This approach has particular potential in
relation to ESRs that are absent from the text of the Basic Law or ESRs that are
formulated in ways that leads them to be interpreted as policy standards rather
than fundamental rights.
(3) It is possible for the SCC to use international law – the recent (2014)
ratification of ICESCR by Palestine has particular potential in this respect. This will
provide further weight to arguments that insist upon the obligatory character of
ESRs within national jurisdiction, placing particular emphasis upon those that do
not contradict the text of the Basic Law.
(4) It is also possible for the SCC to negatively enforce ESRs. This can be
achieved by reviewing actions undertaken by the Palestinian Authority and by
ordering the government to refrain from hindering the satisfaction of ESRs.
Neither course of action requires the extensive or sustained use of public
resources.
(5) The SCC can decide to enforce ESRs upon an individual basis, thereby
providing justice in the specific instance. This would help it to avoid large-scale
policy interventions that could potentially impact the public budget.
The Palestinian SCC’s change of attitude doesn’t have to be immediate. This
certainly wasn’t the case in most countries that have achieved statehood in the
aftermath of sustained conflict. Upon the basis of these wider examples, it seems
more likely that this change will occur incrementally, with Palestinian judges
taking small steps at a time, hesitantly and tentatively stepping beyond the
familiar environs of the legal status quo.(55) This slow progression may conceivably
take the form of individualized enforcement, the indirect linking of ESRs and CPRs
or the negative enforcement of ESRs. Alternatively, the SCC may interpret Article
10 in a way that incorporates new ESRs into the text. In concluding, we should
acknowledge the possibility that the actions of the SCC judges may be driven by
what they perceive as the basic values of the Palestinian constitutional system –
under this happy circumstance, equality, justice and basic rights would come to
function as the driving forces of constitutional reform.

(55) King, ‘Introduction,’ 1,2, 9.
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قابلية الحقوق االقتصادية واالجتماعية
للتقاضي في فلسطين :التطبيق،
اإلنفاذ ،ودور المحكمة الدستورية العليا

د .عاصم خليل

أستاذ القانون الدستوري والدويل املشارك
نائب رئيس جامعة بريزيت للشؤون املجتمعية
ملخص البحث باللغة العربية:

يف هذا البحث سأتعرض للمكانة الدستورية للحقوق االقتصادية واالجتامعية يف
فلسطني ،عىل ضوء ما حيتويه القانون األسايس الفلسطيني من إشارة رصحية لبعض
منها .فبعكس ما يظهر يف القانون الدويل حلقوق اإلنسان فإن احلقوق االقتصادية
واالجتامعية ال تظهر يف القانون األسايس ويف اخلربات الدستورية املقارنة عىل أهنا ّ
كل
متكامل فقد حيتوي النص عىل بعض احلقوق ويتغافل عن غريها .كام أن القانون
األسايس ال يمنح املكانة نفسها لكافة احلقوق االقتصادية واالجتامعية التي وردت يف
النص الدستوري ،حيث أن ذلك يعتمد إىل حد كبري عىل طريقة صياغة تلك احلقوق
من جهة وعىل ممارسة الفاعلني الرسميني يف الدولة ،وأمهها املحاكم .ويف حال أن
صياغة بعض احلقوق االقتصادية واالجتامعية يف القانون األسايس تشري بام ال يقبل
الشك عىل أهنا حقوق دستورية يرتتب عليها التزامات قانونية ملزمة عىل الدولة،
سيتم نقاش مدى إمكانية اعتبار تلك احلقوق يف الوقت ذاته قابلة للتقايض أمام
املحكمة الدستورية العليا .وهبذا الشأن سأتعرض للمواقف الداعمة والرافضة لدور
املحكمة الدستورية العليا يف إنفاذ احلقوق االقتصادية واالجتامعية يف فلسطني
ومربرات كل منهام.
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